Cardano Governance – The Era Of Voltaire Is Upon Us | CoinMarketBag

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But before we do as we always do here on the show um I do have to give a disclaimer so nothing here is financial advice I am not a financial advisor this is just YouTube this is for education purposes uh do your own research um and so we’re going to be talking About…

But before we do as we always do here on the show um I do have to give a disclaimer so nothing here is financial advice I am not a financial advisor this is just YouTube this is for education purposes uh do your own research um and so we’re going to be talking About governance proposals I’m going to pop up the uh proposal we’re talking about on the screen you will see a link to this proposal in the description down below so if you’d like to follow along as we go uh you know please go ahead and do that as well Also if you are here in chat uh drop a high let me know that you’re here I know this is kind of a last minute uh stream so um if you’re watching afterwards I also please uh let me know I’d love your thoughts your comments this is very much An evolving space I want to say hi to Sir Karen um right at the start yes it’s great to have you along for the whole episode as well and Brian hey hey good to see that you’re still in the cardano world interested in all things cardano so what Is the uh sub 1694 you can see here this is uh the formal title I guess is an Unchained decentralized governance mechanism for Voltaire so Volterra being kind of the the Final Phase of cardana where it moves to decentralized governance you can see kind of the folks That have put this together you’ve got Jared from iohk Matthias from the Cardinal Foundation you’ve got you know Kevin from iohk uh Charles who we know um and then Samuel so these look like the authors on this particular document um also do want to say that you know as I’m giving my thoughts it’s it’s very easy for me to come here as you know someone on YouTube throwing our thoughts I know that the folks who have worked hard on this have put a lot of thought into it um so by no means are my comments here meant to denigrate Anyone’s work uh this is just my uh contribution to try and share my thoughts and kind of improve the process you know I’m a Corona Staker I’m uh you know a very strong user of all the D5 tools so I care that we move into a Governance system that uh lets us have a bright future and if we don’t do that I think we’re all going to be in in trouble so it’s it’s shared with with that perspective um you know I did have a lot of folks telling me I should go to the GitHub and I should add my comments there um and I’m gonna I’m gonna still give that a shot but this is you know I’m seeing like all sorts of weird errors um you know if I scroll up here I’m also seeing uh you know lots of comments that Can refer back to places in the document and honestly GitHub I think is just a mess so sorry I know that’s the tool that the team at iohk has chosen for some of this um I think strong feedback I would give is that if you’re wanting to get broad Inclusive feedback from folks who are not Engineers as I think we will need more of as we move into governance because we’re going to tackle things from uh you know politics to product to marketing all those sorts of things will come up as we as we dig into it and so I Strongly encourage looking at a model that has a lot of this discussion pushed to forums I think the cosmos team does a pretty good job you can see this is a cosmos Hub forum and a lot of their discussions and some of them are very vibrant right we’ve got Um you know I think the uh one of the top ones recently was prop 82 you can see that there were you know 150 some comments on it and a lot of discussion you know here as well as on social forums and this is very accessible to everyone Um if you are in the cardano world and you haven’t seen Cosmos governance uh I strongly strongly encourage you to take a look I’ve got the link down below as well this is minscan which you can see all the proposals on and you can see how they’re ordering it kind of the Experience that people have coming in to vote you can see the quorums that they’ve set up you can see the percentage of stake how many people are actually voting in each of these how votes are distributed between validators and users and it just gives you a good sense if you’re kind of grounding Yourself in like what does cardana do you should look to governance that is very active already and working with within the system not not to say there’s not going to be drama there is always drama or we are humans this is going to be governance um but the tools at least Should support the kind of least this amount of drama possible through through all of this um so that’s that’s kind of an introduction to everything I think as we dig into uh sub 1694 I think there’s there’s really uh four components that are worth considering um so the four components that I Mentioned in the document uh that I understood from it was the first is a constitution uh the Constitution and I’ll um scroll quickly to cut around the Constitution is a text document that defines card on our shared values guiding principles um it’s I guess they’re saying meant to be an informal document that Unambiguously captures cardano’s core values you know at some point in the future they’re thinking maybe that’ll get enshrined as a smart contract but for right now it’s this informal document I think the big thing that you know would have a concern with here is That a lot of what we talk about in sub 1694 is dependent on the Constitutional committee which we’ll get into a second referencing the Cardona Constitution the cardano Constitution doesn’t exist as far as I could tell it’s yet to be written so I feel like that’s a strong Interplay between those two aspects of governance and without actually having the Constitution it’s difficult to tell uh you know how broad or narrow a particular Powers would be um in the Constitution um a constitution I would think would have to be something that was very broadly agreed on um yeah Provided some specific set of core values that was almost uncontroversial to to folks and we would all sort of agree that that’s the case you know in um in in the US I think at Constitutional Convention requires uh some some large majority of States I think it’s 66 percent Um to to come together in order to be able to change a constitution to create a constitutional amendment and so that feels like the same sort of uh bar that we would need to meet for any sort of cardano Constitution that feels like a lot more of a difficult exercise than Even this particular Improvement proposal so that’s you know uh one uh that’s one component of the sub that is called out specifically is not a thing they’re covering but it very much impacts everything that’s in here and so that’s something to bear in mind uh the second component of the Sip is a Governance body now the the way they’ve structured the governance body is that there are probably three different pieces of the governance body there’s a constitutional committee this constitutional committee is essentially is the same care a set of individuals or entities who are responsible for overseeing the governance actions as we’ll get into They have fairly broad power so that’s one part of the governance body uh the second part of the governance body see if I can find it here is SPO so stake pool operators these are folks that you you kind of know and love these are the folks that you stake with Um they’re part of the uh the one of the governance bodies as well and then the final part which is kind of a New Concept that’s introduced is the delegated Representatives um so the delegated representatives are effectively act like a stake pool operator but for your vote so rather than running technical infrastructure Rather than producing blocks their their job is essentially to be a representative of the community to understand what’s being proposed and to vote with some measure of you know understanding and engagement with some of these proposals now I’m very much a fan of a delegated representation model Because I don’t think that every single person who’s in the Cardona ecosystem every Staker will necessarily have the time or the inclination to go into that level of depth in fact we just went through this the similar exercise on kajira which is a chain that I’m very Much involved in and you know I’m actually effectively a delegated representative for their treasuries you know with eight other folks and with setups specifically because you know not every person has the the time or the inclination to get into it and so I think that’s a model that that is good I Know some folks have been pushing strongly for a direct democracy but I do think introducing this drap is a positive step and I’ve got some caution so I’ll get into into that as well so you know as you look at the a governance body again just to recap we’ve got the Constitutional committee Um these are the folks with very broad Powers we’ve got the stake pool operators folks that we know and love and then we’ve got this new role called the drap now let’s let’s start with a constitutional committee because I think this is probably where I have most of my Concerns uh with the with the different parts of the governance bodies uh let me see if I can find it okay so I’ll read this to you um and and actually as as we’re going I think you know Brian brings up a good point here that uh at least in Canada The provinces have more power than the country I think the same is supposed to be true in the US um and yeah it would be interesting to see how that diffusion of power ultimately comes about I think checks and balances diffusion of power is extremely valuable In any system that you’re setting up and so that’s something that we should look to have um but let’s look at the uh constitutional committee because I think this is one where in my impression it’s overpowered um so the initial constitutional committee will constitute the core members of a member-based Organization dedicated to the development of cardano so the way to interpret that is iog Cardona Foundation um and maybe a couple other you know Key Community actors essentially these are the people who’ve been doing governance anyway and um let’s talk about what this what power it has basically this constitutional Committee will have the power to veto almost any type of governance action um so there’s multiple different types of governance actions that are talked about in this document um they apart from a vote of no confidence in the entire committee or in a state of no confidence the uh Ability to elect a new committee those are the only two things that the uh the Constitutional committee does not have veto power over every single other action they have veto power so adding a new uh committee they have veto power over that updating the Constitution veto power hard folk initiation veto power Protocol parameter changes veto power treasury withdrawal veto power so what I’m the reason I’m kind of going step by step through that is just to impress upon you that the Constitutional committee has a an extremely large amount of power there will be populated by the entities that are currently in Control control of cardano so I personally do not believe that this is in any way decentralized governance uh in fact it almost enshrines the uh Power of these particular centralized entities into quote unquote decentralized governance and we can rub a stamp it and kind of move on so I think we should all Be concerned about the level of power that the Constitutional committee has now I know as we walk through this that there are a particular uh I guess ways that the um constitutional committee can be voted out so there’s there’s two actions here you can take a vote of no Confidence if you have a vote of no confidence it requires the approval of not just the the Reps but also the stake pool operators so it’s a very very high bar in order to put forward a vote of no confidence in the Constitutional committee effectively there’s no other Way to change them while there are Provisions to change the the Constitutional committee without voting no confidence uh they can veto that so effectively the only way that the community can come and stand up is to have a majority of spos and a majority of delegated Representatives all coming And voting or confidence honestly the chance of that is very very remote would have to be in extreme circumstance and I’m not comfortable with governance being enshrined um continuously except for an extreme circumstance like there’s a reason that countries have elections on you know some regular Cadence that people have to Go up for uh to to be elected they have to run to to get elected into office and all of these ensure that you don’t have a Robert Mugabe that sits there for however many years until you know eventually he’s too old to do anything um so yeah I think accelerate profits You’ve nailed it yet contribution constitutional committee uh needs some sort of term limit it needs some way that it’s uh within the normal processes of the system that they can be replaced now I do understand that we can’t just go from centralized governance that we have today to fully decentralized elect Random person off the street I think we need a smoother ramp and I would love to see included in here maybe it’s you know the initial four years we have this and we have a vote after four years or two years to to um allow some sort of smooth process Thank you for for agreeing as well here um so that’s my my first point is constitutional committee seems to me to be overpowered in this in this whole system um and uh yeah I’m gonna say uh in my tweet series that’s coming out in the second Um I say let’s let me not put too final points on it uh 1694 is set up such that IRG um and the Cardona found foundation will effectively never lose control over cardano outside of very extreme circumstances so it’s it’s not decentralized governance um Eric uh welcome I feel like all we’ve Been doing today is talking about uh governance on cardano um so I’m doing my best to share uh and and to support and you know thanks Rick and I had a great conversation this morning as well you’ll find it on Twitter um I will also link It to this particular video as well so if you’re interested in some of that conversation uh Rick tends to be a little more massive and thoughtful than me I’m a little bit more uh passionate and fiery in my thoughts so it’s a good balance okay so we talked a bit about the Constitutional committee um let’s let’s see what else we can talk about here um so I’m just going through my notes quickly um and so the Constitution as I talked about is yet to be to be written uh we do have this uh idea that um there are multiple parties who can Participate in all of this however one party that is currently not able to participate is the independent Ada holders or stakers so they talked about the governing governance bodies we’ve got the Constitutional committee talk a lot about that we’ve got spos we know them and love them and we’ve got the Cardano draps which I think is a fantastic idea for governance but specifically Ada stakers do not have a direct way to vote as the Sip is currently written now there is a provision where it says that anyone can pay a deposit to become a drip the size of that deposit is yet unknown Um so I think you know if the deposit is small we can have you know one one character of conversation if the deposit is large and I would consider uh you know three four five thousand Ada to be a large deposit um it’s a it’s a meaningful sum for many In our community especially as we talk a lot to care about inclusive accountability and we make sure that all regions have the ability to participate and we don’t make the blockchain too big and don’t require too much networking we should have exactly the same focus on our governance we shouldn’t require People to be extremely wealthy in order to participate within the governance framework here um so I would push strongly you know only on the order of uh if this is the model that we’re going with it should be closer to 10 or 100 either not a thousand or ten thousand or a hundred Thousand Ada I think everyone should be able to have a voice within the particular system so that’s one um it doesn’t it doesn’t seem to account for the fact that independent Ada holders who’s taking can actually you know feel easily just vote their stake I think the more concerning part here is Even if there is a process to become a drip and even if it is accessible call it 100 Ada I think that’s a reasonable reasonably accessible amount for even you know people across the world what happens if your d-rep decides to vote in a way that you don’t like for a particular Controversial proposal as I understand it is written right now is that there is no way to kind of redelegate your voting stake to someone else outside of that proposal and there is no way to override their vote so effectively if a controversial proposal comes up and you’re representative your drap votes in A way that you don’t like there is nothing you can do about it and I think that’s bad I’m going to talk about Cosmos again Cosmos has this beautiful system where everyone who is staking Adam can override the vote of their delegator their system uses delegators I think This is more advanced to use draps as well I think that’s more appropriate um but they can override it and I think that’s an important piece that’s missing in uh in the Sip that we’re talking about is that uh individual Ada stakers are not given a mechanism to override Their d-rep for a given particular vote and so I think that’s something that’s important we absolutely need it um that I think you know as we we talk about governance I like to think about the balancing or the powers of all the different organizations and the balancing of the expertise and at the End of the day as Ada stakers we’re the ones who are in control of the chain it’s our chain it’s a community chain um my understanding from reading through it and from conversations I’ve had uh isama is that there won’t really be any barriers for you to be able to become a Representative for your own wallet apart from potentially the size of the Ada that you would need to to pledge now there’s a question of whether you’re pledging it and you’re no longer getting rewards on it um I’m not sure how all that’s going to work I think very much you need to have A system where if you are kind of delegating your stake to to kind of voting power that you still also need to be able to to stake it and earn rewards on it it seems um strange that we would split those two in a way that we essentially reduce the Security of the network by requiring it to unstick in order to stake to vote so I’m hoping they’ll figure that one out um you know it wasn’t clear to me in the technical details of of the stuff um but that’s not something I’m as concerned about because it seems like That would be the obvious thing to do was essentially allow that kind of dual stake model where you could stake both to an SPO from a technical perspective to produce blocks as well as to a drap from a governance perspective um please let me know if you have any Questions as well as we go along uh so that’s you know who gets to vote is uh one set of concerning things uh as well and I’m you know raising concerns here uh because I think um you know there’s a couple things I mentioned that they’ve Done well but I think more important is to call out places where they could continue to improve um so we talked about the threshold for draps uh still being discussed um uh yeah let me pull up the the set of governance actions that they have now so we talked through these Um I like this as the initial set of governance actions in particular the idea that we have hard Fork initiation now hard folk is really like that’s the Big Kahuna right that’s the one that lets you essentially change the entire blockchain so the fact that we have that Power given to governance is very important that’s a good thing the fact that the Constitutional committee is effectively the same folks who run it today is concerning so you know six or one half a dozen of the other basically um I’m not sure I fully understand your commentary accelerate profits about L2 Individual holders should have a democratic vote I’m not sure what the L2 individual holders mean um there was a discussion about some of the potential technical limitations this came up in the conversation I had with Rick and Andrew earlier where there was a concern that you know too many people Would be voting on chain and therefore most of the transactions on chain would essentially be spent for governance um I think we’re overestimating how many individual people will participate um so let’s let’s take a look at Cosmos and one of their initial in a fairly controversial proposals that got very High I think it was like 75 of all stake voted now Cosmos is slightly smaller than the corona Network so that’s something as well to bear in mind um the total number of votes from users so we had um you know I’m just going to quickly Add this in my head we’re going to talk just less than 60 000 votes came through um yeah less than 60 000 then obviously the validators voted as well uh but that doesn’t seem like a lot and and they also have you know Melinda wallets that have been created So I I doubt we’ll get anywhere close to the 1.2 million uh wallets that have staked Ada actually going ahead and and voting I think we’ll actually be lucky if we get on the order of a hundred thousand every Epoch um and generally you know with the setup that We have at direct I think what people will do is they’ll find someone who generally agrees with their perspectives maybe vote on controversial topics but largely like not participate unless it’s really a big deal let’s take a look at you know kind of a more recent proposal that was a little less controversial Just to see how that one’s going and you can see it’s got roughly half the number of votes that have come through um so I really don’t think that’s going to be a problem from a technical perspective I think we’re over designing here we’re thinking a little bit too hard from it What else can we point out so we talked a little bit here the other thing that I really like um is well they have this notion of AVST let me pull up the definition here active voting stick staking threshold um this is basically Quorum so you know You think about uh Quorum you don’t want to have you know 10 Ada verdict on something and maybe six out of the ten Ada votes for it and a proposal goes through that’s kind of ridiculous so the idea is that some meaningful percentage of active voting stake or Quorum should Have before proposal goes through and that’s completely reasonable to me the other thing I really like is that some of these proposals will have an Espio kind of fallback where if for whatever reason the delegated Representatives done don’t vote or don’t we reach the Quorum that you’ll have a fallback and Say like okay the spos get to vote and to me this introduces a level of resiliency into the government a governance of the chain because you know what what could happen a fairly case of the governance could be that uh the delegated Representatives just aren’t voting enough to get Anything through and then the people actually running the technical Network at that point while their expertise may not be those particular governance proposals they can pick up and carry on and ensure that things continue to move so those are generally the folks who currently have the most invested from a Financial perspective right they’ve bought Hardware they’ve set up networking things they’ve devoted their time and their energy so having spos be a backstop I think is just a fantastic idea for the way all of this is working the voting mechanisms will include also yes no and abstain Um so unlike Cosmos which also includes this uh know with veto concept this just currently proposed three options I think those are fine the only concern I would have is that there doesn’t seem to be a mechanism for avoiding spam um so it seems like anyone can propose Something they put a deposit down and if the vote doesn’t pass they get the deposit back after a couple epochs and so I think what that’ll encourage is people just put all sorts of craft through and so there needs to be some sort of uh mechanism to To prevent people from just spamming it could look like some sort of slashing event if your thing doesn’t get to a certain Quorum or a certain number of yes votes or it could look like Cosmos has they have a specific uh no and this is bad and you deserve to have your Deposit slashed um know with veto is what they use so there’s issues with that approach too but I think it does bear in mind thinking about what does it look like to have some sort of spam protection for the governance governance process um how a conclave affect the spos and governance Um I don’t actually know too much about all of those particular proposals so I’m sorry you saw my I can’t answer that particular question um so let me see if there’s anything else if there’s anything else you’d like me to kind of cover and talk a little bit about Um this document here there are a lot of to-do’s still in it so you know it does look like this is very much still a work in progress um they do go into a little bit of technical detail in terms of how it will Be done on chain as well um I think you know from from my perspective that’s not something I’m as deep into at the specific technicalities I think what we should be looking at more is what is the effect going to be from the governance system and how is that going to impact The community and then make sure that whatever technical details need to support those kind of requirements um if you would like to go ahead and comment on this now there’s apparently a way you can comment let me see if I can remember that uh someone sent me a link And so I have a link with comments but for the life of me I don’t know how to get back there that’s why I’m doing a video and a tweet thread instead of commenting on it um okay let me just read through quickly see if there’s anything else I left out Oh something important to talk about is that they aren’t requiring specific digital identifiers for governance and I think that’s a very good thing um I think you know to have an environment where you you’ve got people in different regions different jurisdictions uh not to require any sort of digital identifier is something That’s very positive it allows us to be this kind of fully decentralized chain that allows us to continue pushing forward um a GitHub tutorial above okay I’m gonna have to I mean actually I’m I’m probably not going to learn GitHub I’m sorry uh I would like governance to be Accessible to everyone I think we need to push to bring more people into governance I think we need to make it more accessible to non-engineers by continuing to stick with GitHub what it means is that only the very very diligent folks who aren’t Engineers will Ever have a voice in it and we’re going to be excluding a large portion of the community and I don’t think that’s the right way to do it I know Charles is probably not going to be happy to have all these conversations happen happening On Twitter as as they all want to do but I think we need to build an alternative where conversations can happen without requiring you to take a 30 minute tutorial on how to use GitHub so those are just my two cents um I think that’s my rough read of okay Rex saying GitHub is only temporary that’s great so I’m looking forward to whatever the replacement is um I do agree github’s a great place to track code and to track versioning of their code and that’s fantastic um discussions may be a little bit less good um yeah money for posting cool so if There’s a there’s a formal Forum of that and we can all participate I think that would be uh you know fantastic in this the reason I I haven’t you know talked about any other subs except this on my channel uh well one is because there’s been lots of Subs before I really Started doing this regularly but two is I think this is probably the most important one because it will affect the entire future of how everything gets done on Cardona and so if we set up governance in a way that is faulty uh we need to be sure That one we’re able to fix it um and two you know the the faultiness doesn’t cause the entire chain to falter um and so I think they have erred very strongly on the side of caution here about keeping a large amount of control in the existing entities not and I’ve Called out against that and I think that’s that’s something that we need to be cautious of um but very much this this governance to me doesn’t seem like it’s one that’s going to fall over and harm the chain um at least you know initially it seems more like there’s longer term risks of Centralization to me Okay cool so maybe we’re getting something like lie donation um that’d be cool to have some sort of other governance one you know I very much encourage you to take a look at what Cosmos teams you know Mars protocol has it Astro board has it they’ve got a Lot of great governance tools um and and I know there’s going to be work that needs to be done uh you know I deal with the governance shows up in everyone’s wallet so you know calling out on the wallet folks as well like that’s a place to surface some of these governance conversations Um yeah I think that’s all I had for today um so that’s my review over and I’ll post a Twitter thread in a little bit um thank you everyone for for watching uh if you do I want to like subscribe to all the YouTube things that’d be great Um and also you know if you have questions if you’re watching it afterwards and you’re not sure about something or you disagree with me like I’m wrong often it’s just uh you know I think I think we all are we’re learning we’re at the Forefront of Technology Here on web3 uh drop a comment below and let me know and thank you everyone for showing up in chat I really appreciate you hold the door yes I’ve got I’ve got images from Game of Thrones coming to my mind uh right now uh Rick thank you for uh the kind Words as well always appreciate you um uh yeah and ux4 Voltaire personally a biggest concerns to occur and absolutely I mean this will be the difference between us getting 40 participation and seven percent participation so thanks everyone enjoy the rest of your weekend and I’ll see you all later cheers We dive deep into Voltaire, Cardano Improvement Proposal 1694.The age of governance is almost upon us, yet there is still much to be talked through.Here’s what I think they got right, and what can be improved.#Cardano #ADA Cardano Improvement Proposal 1694 Web: https://github.com/JaredCorduan/CIPs/tree/voltaire-v1/CIP-1694#the-constitution https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/pull/380 Who Gets to Vote: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FqYbOUbXsAA962w?format=jpg&name=medium Cosmos Forum: https://forum.cosmos.network/c/hub-proposals/25 Cosmos Proposals: https://www.mintscan.io/cosmos/proposals Video with Rick and Andrew re: governance: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2hCnmMG1__8 Just Crypto on the Internet Twitter: https://twitter.com/justcryptoshow Web: https://justcrypto.show Kavarii: https://kavarii.com/c/justcrypto Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/JustCrypto Listen on your favorite Podcast app Apple: https://justcrypto.show/applepodcasts Google: https://justcrypto.show/googlepodcasts Spotify: https://justcrypto.show/spotify source.

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